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Abstract: This study examines product differentiation and market structure in the U.S. 
brewpub industry. Brewery restaurants are characterized by whether they are single-
establishment or multiple-establishment restaurants. In particular, I investigate how entry 
behaviors of firms are affected by the existence of opposite type of brewpub in a market. 
I use data from oligopoly brewpub markets across the United States during 2002 and 
2011. The analysis uses a cross sectional data in a discrete dependent variable 
econometric model to predict the profitability of a market. The results indicate that the 
existence of one opposite type of firm in a market makes a market unattractive for a new 
firm, and these effects are diminished when there are two or three opposite of firms 
present in a market. Finally, the effects of demand characteristics, such as population 
size, can be large enough to outweigh the effects of differentiation between firms. 
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I. Introduction 
 The relationship between the market structure and market outcomes has been an 
abiding issue in industrial organization. Economists believe that prices tend to converge 
to the competitive level as the number of firms grows, although the rate of convergence 
depends on numerous factors such as the elasticity of demand. Due to the lack of 
information on prices, characteristics of product, and cost structures, it is difficult to 
separate the demand, strategic factors affecting the presence of firm in a market. As a 
result, establishing the number of firms necessary to ensure effective competition is a 
challenging problem. 
 Several studies, including Bresnahan and Reiss (1988, 1990) and Xiao and 
Orazem (2010), have developed econometric model addressing the relationship between 
market structure and the entry decisions of firms. Bresnahan and Reiss define profits by 
multiplying market size by profit variables then subtracting fixed cost, with each of these 
three elements defined as a reduced-form linear function. Several studies utilized a 
reduced form profit model to explain why firms prefer to enter some markets more then 
others. By using a reduced form profit model, this paper will examine whether 
differentiation among firms is helpful to explain brewery restaurant entrant behavior 
across the United States markets. In particular, I will analyze how entry behaviors of 
firms are affected by the existence of opposite type of brewpub in a market.  
 Brewery restaurants or the brewpub industry is an interesting subject to study 
because the industry has been expanding recently. This study investigates features of 
localized markets needed to support entry of brewery restaurants. Additionally, cities in 
the United States had experienced competitive brewpubs markets; brewpub restaurants 
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entered into competition with each other. This study provides important contributions to 
the literature by providing evidence of competition between different types of firms in 
markets.  
My empirical analysis of entry model follows the framework of Mazzeo (2002) 
and Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) closely. The model measures how homogeneous 
competitors compete against alternative competitors. 
 I compiled a data set from the list of brewery restaurants in the annual “Industry 
Review” from the magazine The New Brewers (The Brewers Association) from 2003 to 
2012. The survey reports the name and location of brewpubs in the U.S.  The data on 
characteristics of each market were drawn from 2000 and 2010 Population Census in 
Census County Subdivisions (CCSs) level. The measure of market size is the total 
population in CCSs. I also use age, ethnicity, education level, and median household 
income as factors that might affect local demand of brewpubs. In addition, I use annual 
mean wage for jobs involving food preparation from Bureau of Labor Statistics to control 
for the decision to open the brewpubs. 
Besides providing evidence about the competition between different types of 
firms, this paper studies an interesting industry that has not been much investigated. The 
past research on the brewing industry has generally focused on the mass-production 
breweries (e.g. Tramblay and Bremblay, 2005). The microbreweries in the U.S. have 
diminished during the prohibition period. However, they have recently increased in 
number. Thus, the studies of entry and endogenous market structure would help us 
understand this rapid growth of the brewpub industry better.  
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II. Literature review 
The study of the market structure of oligopoly and market outcome has been a 
longstanding issue in industrial organization due to the lack of important information on 
prices, firms’ cost structures, and characteristics of product. Many economists try to 
predict the condition sufficient for a firm to enter a market. 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, 1991) propose a link between models of 
endogenous market structure and models examining market competition. Since the 
information on price-cost margins is limited, they use cross sectional variation in the 
number of firms to link entry thresholds with changes in firms’ competition. Ultimately, 
they determine the market sizes or total population in the market required to support 
different numbers of firms. 
The breakeven market sizes or different numbers of population required to 
support one, two, or three firms provide information about how competition changes with 
entry of additional firms. In other words, the first entrant has monopoly power to charge a 
higher price; it can recover fixed entry and production costs with a relatively small 
number of units sold or customers served. As additional firms enter the market, these 
firms’ power to set price may diminish relative to the first entrant. As prices fall, a larger 
market size or a larger number of customers served are needed to recover from the fixed 
costs. Hence, the entrant of the second firm requires a greater market size than the first 
entrant, and the entrant of the third firm requires an even larger market size than the 
second entrant, and so forth. Once there are three to five firms in a market, Bresnahan 
and Reiss (1991) find that the next entrant does not change the market competitive level 
much. 
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The variation in entry threshold reveals information about the changes in 
competition as additional firms enter a market. Manuszak (1999) follows Bresnahan and 
Reiss’s framework of using a market entry model to determine entry condition and 
competition in the 19th century American brewing industry.  
The advantage of such structure is that researchers can allow the number of 
competing firms to enter the variable profits function and the fixed cost function 
separately, and thus allow for different interpretation about the role of market structure. 
Economists can estimate an entry threshold or a measure of the market size required to 
support a given number of firms.  
 However, the structural model approach has some limitation as Bresnahan and 
Reiss point out in their paper. First, the methodology is best suited to geographically 
distinct local markets. So, the market boundaries have to be clearly defined. Mobile 
populations may be willing to drive a considerable distance to access some service 
providers such as health practitioners or auto dealers, making it difficult to pin down the 
exact number of firms operating in the local market. Second, the entry threshold ratios 
vary significantly across industries. Large differences in threshold ratios may suggest 
more variation in competitive conduct than actually exists.  
 Researchers do not make this distinction modeling profit by a single reduced form 
equation. This is explained in that variable profits do not necessarily increase in 
proportion to market size, and measures of variable profits and fixed costs usually are 
unavailable. For the same reasons, I decide to adopt a reduced form profit function. 
 In order to make inferences about the relationship between market competition 
and the number of operating firms, I need to consider factors that affect inherent features 
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of localized markets that affect firms’ profitability. These factors include the costs of 
entering and operating, and the size of local market demand.  
 As of costs of entering and operating, we need to hypothesize that brewery 
restaurants required that their post-entry variable profits can cover their fixed cost of 
entry (Bresnahan and Reiss, (1991), Manuzak (2006)). Thus, the amount of fixed costs 
influences brewpub entry behavior. These fixed costs include engineering costs, 
marketing expenses, etc.  
 There are differences across cities in the costs of providing services including 
both fixed and operating costs. If a firm has multiple establishments, it could share fixed 
and operating costs such as marketing costs, administrative costs, etc. Additionally, the 
variation in population, restaurant activity, and other factors might contribute to the 
demand, hence profitability, for the brewery restaurants. Tremblay and Tremblay (2005) 
suggest that prices of beer, the prices of substitutes and complements, the consumer’s 
income, the product’s characteristics, and the consumer’s level of consumption capital 
could influence the demand for beer as well. 
 Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) conclude that the distinction between national and 
local telecommunication entry in service offerings affect entry behavior. They suggest 
that customers find the two types of firms to be imperfect substitutes. Similar to the 
brewpub industry, the brewery restaurants usually are costumed to customer needs 
because they are located close to their customers. Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) 
propose that some consumers prefer local products to items produced by large firms. 
Brewery restaurants target local costumers by sponsoring community event, providing 
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displays in local establishments, and distributing bar boasters. This might be the reason 
that local and national brewpubs would potentially differ in the minds of consumers. 
 By following the framework of Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) closely, I will 
examine the effects of differentiation between firm-type, specifically single and multiple 
establishment firms, on entry behavior.  
 
III. Data 
 In order to determine entry thresholds for brewpub, we need to define the local 
market. Since brewpubs sell more than 50 percent of their craft-style beer on site, 
brewpubs intend to serve local customers. In normal circumstances, consumers go to 
brewpubs close to their neighborhoods. Still, consumers’ demand has some mobility 
because customers can travel from one market to another. To simplify the problem, I 
assume that the consumer’s demand has zero mobility. Thus, definition of market is 
defined. 
 The primary data set used in this study is compiled from:  
1. Cross-sectional information about the presence of brewery restaurant. 
The New Brewers Magazine reports firms operating in cities across the 
United States. The survey includes the identities of the firms, locations, 
and their production level [2003, 2012]. 
2. Cross-sectional information about the demographic for breweries 
restaurants in county subdivision level. The demographics and other 
economic conditions come from 2000 and 2010 U.S. Census.  
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The data set is not an ideal one due to a few major restrictions for several reasons. 
First, brewery restaurants are not required to report their presence to the Craft Beer 
Association. Secondly, even though the survey has an important variable of interest - 
location, it neither provides a total number of brewpubs in a city level nor a clear 
definition of markets other than state.  
To complement the main data, I find the brewpubs’ locations in a county 
subdivision level. Then, I count the number of brewpubs categorized by the cities that 
they are located in, and merge information from the 2000 and 2010 Population Census 
based on Census County Subdivision (CCSs).  
The measurement of market size is the population in CCSs. I also use age, 
ethnicity, education level, and median household income as factors that might affect local 
demand of brewpubs. Additionally, I use annual mean wage for jobs involving food chief 
and food preparation from Bureau of Labor Statistics to control for the decision to open 
the brewpubs.  
Sample selection and summary statistics 
 By using a data on cross-section of markets, I attempt to examine competition 
among brewery restaurants. To do so, I need to differentiate firms into firms with single 
establishment and firms with multiple establishments. Additionally, I need to carefully 
define markets in a way that only firms in the market compete with each other and that no 
firms outside the defined market are competitors. 
 The market definition is at the level of county subdivision level. The breweries 
restaurant provide inherently locally focused – the firm must establish a presence in a city 
in order to connect customers residing there. This makes most small and medium-sized 
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cities geographically distinct market area. I also include larger cities and Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the analysis. 
 I construct a sample of every city in the United States with at least one brewpub in 
either 2002, 2005, 2008, or 2011. There are total of 947 observations in the sample. The 
Table I shows the firm counts from 2002 to 2011. The number in each cell indicates the 
number of cities that have corresponding number of operating brewery restaurants. 
Roughly 27 to 35 percent of the sample does not have a brewpub when the survey occurs. 
A total of 49 to 55 percent of the cases had only one firm operating. The numbers of 
cities with no brewpub are getting smaller as more firms operate.  
 Table	  I:	   	  Number	  of	  Operating	  Brewery	  Restaurants	  in	  the	  Market	  	  	   	   Year	  
Operating	   2002	   2005	   2008	   2011	  
0	   334 305 302 258 
1	   446 476 503 519 
2	   92 100 84 114 
3+	   75 66 58 56 
Total	   947 947 947 947 
 
 To study the differentiation among brewpubs, I classify firms into discrete 
categories on the basis of how they vary in the geographic extent of their operations. As 
was previously discussed, product characteristics associated with a brewpub’s geographic 
footprint may attract different types of customers. I classify brewery restaurants to be 
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single establishment if they operate in one location. If firms that have two or more 
restaurants operating within a few cities or in multiple regions of the country, they are 
labeled multi establishment. 
 Table II contains the breakdown between the single and the multi establishment 
brewpubs across the individual markets in the data set. Part A of the table summarizes the 
firm counts in 2002 with the number of cities that have corresponding number of 
operating single establishment and multi establishment.  
 Similarly to Part A, Part B of Table II specifies similar data for 2011. The number 
of cities with no operating brewpubs had reduced to 258. Note that the cities with fewer 
operating brewery restaurant typically contain predominately single establishment firms.  
 
Table II: Number of Multiple and Single establishment brewpubs per City 
 
A. 2002 Data 
 
 Multiple establishment Brewpubs 
Single establishment 
Brewpub 
0 1 2 3+ Total 
0 334 78 12 1 425 
1 368 31 8 6 413 
2 49 8 7 3 67 
3+ 16 14 8 4 42 
Total 767 131 35 14 947 
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B. 2011 Data  
 
 Multiple establishment Brewpubs 
Single establishment 
Brewpub 
0 1 2 3+ Total 
0 258 96 12 1 367 
1 423 37 3 7 470 
2 66 9 5 3 83 
3+ 14 6 3 4 27 
Total 761 148 23 15 947 
 
 To study differentiation among brewery restaurants, we need to account for the 
differences of localized features of the cities that attract brewpubs. To control the effects 
for these differences, I collected demographic data for each city in the sample. The data is 
gathered from 2000 and 2010 U.S. Censuses in county subdivision level. The data in 
county level is used instead when information at the county subdivision is unavailable.  
 Market size is a very important variable. Brewery restaurants intend to service 
resident population. Thus, the number of town population reflects firms’ profitability. 
Population measures each city’s town population, PHouseholds corresponds to the 
percentage of households maintained by families in each city, and Median Household 
Income denotes the average income of the city’s residents.  
 Some variables characterize the composition of each city. PMale describes the 
percentage of the population who were male. PHighSchool denote the percentage of 
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population that obtain high school education or higher. PGerman and PIrish denote the 
percentage of population that has German and Irish ancestry, respectively.  
The variable Median Wage Food Prep denotes the average wage for jobs 
involving food cooking and food preparation. Area represents land area in square miles 
for each city in the sample. Note that the annual data for demographics is not available at 
the level of individual cities. And, the year-on-year changes in these variables should not 
be large enough to considerably affect entry decisions. 
Table III describes demographic variables mentioned above. Data in part A are 
from Census 2000, and data in part B are from Census 2010. In part A, on average, 
markets have a population of 109,160 with a land area of 67.645 square miles. Roughly 
49 % are male.  Median income average $44 thousand with 84.5% of population having 
had at least high school education.  
For the data from Census 2010, on average, markets have a population of 
113,483. Male population was decreased to 42.7 %.  Median income average $54 
thousand with 88.3% of population having had at least high school education. Note that 
the information on ancestry’s race was available in Census 2000 only. On average, 
markets have 12.9% German, and 19.8% Irish. 
 
IV. Empirical Models of Brewpubs Entry 
 This paper utilizes a reduced form profit function to evaluate the behavior of 
firms’ decisions to enter the brewery restaurants industry. The baseline model focuses on 
a key difference between single establishment firms and multiple establishment firms 
observed in particular years of a growing market.  
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  Table	  III:	   Explanatory	  Variables	  –	  Summary	  Statistics	  	  
Variable	   A.	  2000	   B.	  2010	  
Mean	   Standard	  
Variable	  
Mean	   Standard	  
Variable	  
Population	  (in	  million)	   0.1091602 0.274 0.1134833 0.272 
PHouseholds	   0.647 0.095 0.633 0.098 
Area	  (in	  ten	  thousand)	   0.0067654 0.044 0.0067654 0.044 
PHighSchool	   0.845 0.073 0.883 0.065 
Median	  Household	  Income	  
(in	  ten	  thousand)	  
0.0443075 0.015 0.0544056 0.020 
Median	  Age	   36.027 5.405 38.135 6.719 
PMale	   0.491 0.022 0.427 0.019 
PGerman	   0.129 0.050 0.129 0.050 
PIrish	   0.198 0.112 0.198 0.112 
Median	  Wage	  Food	  Prep	  
(in	  thousand)	  
1.829379 0.051 1.829379 0.051 
 
 Econometrician infers the economic factors that contribute to the equilibrium of 
the observed market structure by using a cross-section of markets as a data. Firms either 
choose to enter or not enter a particular market. The estimation can be complicated 
because the decision of competing firms influences the expected profitability of potential 
alternatives.  
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(i) Entry Model 
 In general, the profits and costs in brewery restaurants cannot be observed. 
However, many previous empirical papers on market entry have estimated the underlying 
profitability of a market by inferring from the number of firms in a market to 
characteristics of market. These studies use the number of firms as a dependent variable. 
Assuming that the variation in market structures is iid normal across markets, one can use 
an ordered probit model to estimate a reduced form profit function.  
 A reduced form profit function might look like: 𝜋!(𝑁!   ,𝑦! ,𝑤! ) = 𝑦!𝛼 +   𝑁!𝛽 +   𝑤! 𝛾 +   𝜀!  , 
where m denotes an isolated market. Markets might have different characteristics wm that 
affect demand for the firms’ products or firms’ market specific costs. The term Nm 
denotes the number of firms that have entered the market. Its coefficient, 𝛽, indicates the 
extent to which additional market participants make entry less attractive. The term 𝜀!   denotes variation in market structures or the components of firm profits that are 
unobservable by economists.  
 Assume that the number of firms in the market (Nm) reflects the outcome of 
competition between the firms in market m. Then, this assumption implies that the 
number of operating firms in a market is in equilibrium. In other word, markets are 
containing the maximum number of firms such that the market m is profitable for each of 
those firms to enter given conditions in that market. In particular, the equilibrium number 
of firms in market m is defined by: 
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  𝑁!∗  = 0   if 𝜋!!  + εm < 0 
  𝑁!∗  = N   if 𝜋!!  + εm ≥ 0 and 𝜋!!!! + εm < 0  
where 𝜋!! =   𝜋 𝑁! = 𝑁,𝑦!,𝑤! .  
 Assume further that the random term εk is iid normal across markets, the 
probabilities of observing N firms in market m are: 
  P(𝑁!∗  = 0)  =  1 – Φ(𝜋!! ) 
  P(𝑁!∗  = 1)  =  Φ(𝜋!! ) – Φ(𝜋!! ) 
  P(𝑁!∗  = 2)  =  Φ(𝜋!! ) – Φ(𝜋!! ) 
  P(𝑁!∗  ≥ 3)  =  Φ(𝜋!! ) 
where Φ(  ) is the cdf of a standard normal random variable with the variance of the 
disturbance term normalized to one. Note that this assumption allows me to use the 
ordered probit model to estimate the parameters. 
(ii) Extensions to Heterogeneous Markets 
 By following the Greenstein and Mazzeo’s framework, I can extend the approach 
(i) to analyze firms in heterogeneous markets. Suppose that each market could have firms 
of two types, X and Y. Suppose that at the equilibrium, there are NX and NY observed 
firms for firms type X and firms type Y, respectively. Similarly to (1), a reduced form of 
type-specific profit function might look like: 𝜋!"(𝑁!!",𝑦! ,𝑤! ) = 𝑦!𝛼 +   𝑁!!"𝛽!! +   𝑤! 𝛾 +   𝜀!  , 
where N-Tm denotes the number of firms of the other type, and the term 𝜋!" denotes 
expected profit of firm in which characterized by the number of same-type firms in the 
market. This model allows me to look at the effects of competitors to vary on the basis of 
whether they offer the same or different product types. 
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A market observed with two types X and Y implies that the following equalities 
hold: 𝜋! 𝑋,𝑌 > 0 ,    𝜋! 𝑋 + 1,𝑌 < 0 𝜋! 𝑋,𝑌 > 0 ,    𝜋! 𝑋,𝑌 + 1 < 0 𝜋! 𝑋,𝑌 > 𝜋! 𝑋 − 1,𝑌 + 1 > 0 ,  𝜋! 𝑋,𝑌 > 𝜋! 𝑋 + 1,𝑌 − 1 > 0 
In case of brewery restaurant, I assume that there are two possible types of 
brewpub firms – firms with single establishment and firms with multiple establishments. 
Entry decisions made by firms are based on market-by-market basis.  
 Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) clarify in their paper that the potential entrants 
were playing a Stackelberg game in this model. The most profitable type firms will move 
first. The outcome of the market is arrived when no more potential entrants want to enter 
the market at each stage. With assumption that firm within the same type are identical, 
entry is determined at each stage by comparing whether the next local firm is more or less 
profitable than the next national firm, assuming that potential entrants are making optimal 
decisions.  
(iii) Identification and Testing 
 Identification of the parameters representing competitive effects comes from 
comparing otherwise similar markets with different structures or, conversely, different 
markets with otherwise similar structures. The estimated β and γ- parameters help to 
make market more similar as they account for exogenous characteristics and that make 
entry of brewery restaurants industry more attractive. Controlling for market 
characteristics allows us to identify the β -parameters describing competition and make 
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inferences beyond what one could infer from comparisons with random assignment in the 
raw data.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
The model of differentiated entry used in this study allow for up to three firms of 
each product type in the market. Thus, the endogenous market structure variable can take 
on one of nine possible outcomes. The maximum likelihood estimates of the expected 
profit functions from the differentiated entry model are in Table IV. Note the coefficient 
is estimated by order probit model; thus, the sign of the coefficients is interpretable but 
the magnitude of the coefficients is not. Additionally, positive and negative profits should 
be interpreted loosely due to the nature of ordered probit model. For each firm type and 
market configuration, a set of dummy variables is defined, and the corresponding β–
parameters represent the incremental effects of additional competitors on the profits of 
firms in the market: 
β S1 = effect of first multiple est. competitor on single est. brewpubs, 
β S2 = effect of second multiple est. competitor on single est. brewpubs, 
β S3 = effect of third multiple est. competitor on single est. brewpubs, 
β M1 = effect of first single est. competitor on multiple est. brewpubs, 
β M2 = effect of second single est. competitor on multiple est. brewpubs, and 
β M3 = effect of third single est. competitor on multiple est. brewpubs. 
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Table	  IV	  :	   Heterogeneous	  Products	  Model	  	  
 2002 2005 2008 2011 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
 
Effect on Single Establishment Brewery Restaurants 
Population 1.5398 0.3698 0.9909 0.3079 0.8396 0.2760 0.7077 0.2876 
PHouseholds -2.9959 0.5954 -3.2496 0.5679 -2.8695 0.6088 -3.0019 0.5566 
Area -1.4015 0.9069 -1.5815 1.0353 -1.3350 0.8285 0.0451 0.5470 
Multi Est. Competitor #1 -0.3890 0.1416 -0.6342 0.1327 -0.7199 0.1119 -0.7480 0.1328 
Multi Est.  Competitor #2 -0.0620 0.2597 -0.1445 0.2764 0.0271 0.2979 -0.1127 0.3298 
Multi Est. Competitor #3 -0.0763 0.3916 0.2034 0.5087 0.3560 0.3553 0.2388 0.4165 
PHighSchool 0.7925 0.7979 0.8679 0.7968 1.7456 0.8524 1.6472 0.8049 
Median Household Income 9.4636 11.843 23.824 13.593 8.6411 9.8206 17.442 9.9189 
Median Household Income 
square 
-58.872 88.917 -172.29 112.85 -50.48 62.892 -120.55 65.673 
Median Age 0.1154 0.0629 0.1481 0.0651 0.1707 0.0439 0.04890 0.0412 
Median Age square -0.0017 0.0009 -0.0021 0.0009 -0.0023 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0005 
PMale 0.9322 1.7861 0.3473 1.8933 5.3491 1.8976 7.1512 1.6608 
PGerman -0.4915 0.3546 -0.1640 0.3396 -1.2011 0.9130 -2.2814 0.9163 
PIrish -0.4232 0.8804 -2.5404 0.9172 -0.6784 0.3527 -0.2452 0.3630 
Median Wage Food Prep 1.0372 0.7799 1.1730 0.7620 1.6946 0.7924 2.1301 0.7984 
/cut1 (Constant) 3.1031 2.1222 3.6927 2.0705 7.3935 2.0326 7.6967 1.9976 
/cut2 4.5982 2.1202 5.1490 2.0690 9.9737 2.0345 9.3276 2.0018 
/cut3 5.2262 2.1180 5.9216 2.0705 10.719 2.0365 10.134 2.0075 
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 2002 2005 2008 2011 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
 
Effect on Multiple Establishments Brewery Restaurants 
Population 1.3005 0.3135 1.3833 0.4189 1.5757 0.3378 1.3827 0.3279 
PHouseholds -3.1614 0.6317 -3.4505 0.7037 -3.2997 0.7286 -0.5776 0.6796 
Area -4.0577 5.2462 -3.6488 3.6448 -2.1355 2.3854 -0.7150 0.1101 
Single Est. Competitor #1 -0.5130 0.1110 -0.7781 0.1121 -0.9128 0.1393 -0.4170 0.2075 
Single Est. Competitor #2 -0.1551 0.2045 -0.2398 0.1783 -0.3593 0.2155 -0.1905 0.3025 
Single Est. Competitor #3 0.1867 0.2299 0.0433 0.3456 -0.1583 0.3274 -2.6527 0.7431 
PHighSchool 1.3504 1.1308 1.2591 1.1313 1.0384 1.2248 2.2226 1.3047 
Median Household Income 40.817 15.829 40.274 15.357 24.6924 12.570 20.025 11.953 
Median Household Income 
square 
-178.23 122.63 -188.64 117.10 -77.784 80.309 -50.824 72.4268 
Median Age 0.2502 0.1002 0.2715 0.0947 0.2959 0.0832 0.3045 0.0803 
Median Age square -0.0037 0.0014 -0.0037 0.0013 -0.0041 0.0011 -0.0044 0.0011 
PMale -8.1115 2.2294 -7.7670 2.2503 -4.146 2.2233 -3.6406 2.3277 
PGerman -1.6501 0.5465 -0.4593 0.4705 0.9198 0.4477 0.8916 0.4497 
PIrish -3.0681 1.2976 -3.7634 1.2513 -0.8288 1.1298 -1.5210 1.1770 
Median Wage Food Prep -0.9980 1.1124 -0.2900 0.9956 1.4267 0.9887 1.8535 1.0910 
Constant -0.9344 2.9346 0.8583 2.8236 7.3760 2.8978 8.5766 2.9298 
Constant 0.0491 2.9306 1.9344 2.8182 7.5932 2.8985 9.7183 2.9388 
Constant 0.8322 2.9291 2.7267 2.8324 8.0045 2.9161 10.261 2.9340 
 
Column 1 – 4 corresponds to the market outcomes of the observations in 2002, 
2005, 2008, and 2011, respectively. The upper section of the table presents the effect of 
multiple establishment competitors on single establishment brewery restaurants. The 
lower section of the table presents the effect of single establishment competitors on 
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multiple establishment brewery restaurants. The sign of coefficient indicate the 
attractiveness of entry for each type; if the constant is greater than zero, it indicates a firm 
would be more likely to enter.  
 For example, consider the population variable in 2011– the parameter estimate for 
both firm types is positive, which indicates that larger cities attract more brewery 
restaurants of either type. However, the estimated parameter is higher for the multiple 
establishment type of restaurant. This indicates that, as the population in a city increases, 
the relative attractiveness of entry for multiple establishment restaurants increases as 
well.  
 The relative value of the constants indicates that in a market with similar values 
for X variables and with no competing firms, operating a single establishment is on 
average more profitable than operating a multi establishment brewpub from 2002 to 
2008. However, it is more profitable to operate a multiple establishment than a single 
establishment brewpub in 2011 (Cmulti = 8.5766 > Csingle = 7.6967) 
 The demographic composition of a market has a significant impact on the 
profitability of breweries. Single establishment firms prefer to enter a market where high 
PHighSchool, PMale, and Median Wage Food Prep as the coefficients are all positive. 
On the other hand, the multiple establishment firms prefer to enter a market with a high 
percentage of people with high school education or higher (PHighSchool) and lower 
percentage of male population (PMale). The percentage of households that are family 
generally has a negative effect on profitability of both types of firms. The variables 
Median Household Income and Median Age demonstrate non-linear relationship between 
these variables and profitability. The compositions of German and Irish (PGerman and 
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PIrish, respectively) have negative impact on profit even though they are statistically 
insignificant.  
 The parameter estimates the impact of existence of the first firm that are opposite 
type on profitability, β S1 and β M1, are negative. The parameter estimates the impact of 
opposite type of firm on profitability is bigger as there are more firms in a market. This 
indicates the competition in markets is less tough with more firms. 
 It is important to note that the key result in Table IV comes from the β –
parameters which estimate competitive effects on the types of firms. The estimates 
indicate how the two types of firms compete against each another.  
 From the top part of Table IV, the existence of the first multiple establishment 
firm competitor makes entry unattractive. The β –parameters for existence of two 
multiple establishment competitors diminish to nearly zero throughout 2002 – 2011. 
Additionally, the additional multiple establishment firms have smaller affects than the 
first for both two (β M1 = -.3890 < β M2 = -0.062) and three multiple establishment firms (β 
M1 = -0.3890 < β M2 = -0.0763), the β-parameters above are observed from 2002. The 
similar effects can be observed from the effect of single establishment competitor on 
multiple-establishment brewery restaurants.  
 While the estimated β –parameters indicate incentives for firms to offer 
differentiated product, the demand effects are large enough to predict undifferentiated 
product-type configuration in some cases. For example, in 2008, population has a 
positive and significant effect on payoffs of both product types, 0.8396 for single 
establishment firm and 1.5757 for multiple establishments. The relative size of 
coefficients indicates that firms in markets with population above the sample mean tend 
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to choose the multiple-establishment type of firm, while single-establishment firms are 
more attractive in below-average population markets. Consider once again the product 
choice that would like to enter a market with one competitor. Let other X variables be at 
their sample mean, except Population is triple its sample mean at this market. In this 
case,  
πsingle = 7.3935 + (-0.7199) + (0.8396)*(3)*(0.113) = 6.9582, 
πmulti  = 7.3760 + (-0.9128) + (1.5757)*(3)*(0.113) = 6.9974 . 
 
This empirical finding shows that this firm will earn relatively more by operating a chain 
brewpub.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This study empirically investigates the oligopoly market structure implications of 
endogenous product choice by firms. I characterize brewery restaurants into two types: 
single-establishment or multiple-establishment restaurants. This paper examines the 
competition between independent brewpubs and chain brewery restaurants. 
The main conclusions follow from the estimated parameters of the model. First, 
the empirical evidence from oligopoly brewpubs industry show that the existence of one 
opposite type of firm in a market raise fixed costs, hence, makes a market unattractive. 
Successful brewery restaurants were mindful about the characteristics of their 
competitors.  
Second, the effects of the presence of two or three opposite-type competitors on 
profitability are smaller than the effects of the existence of one opposite-type competitor. 
In some case, the presence of three opposite-type competitors encourages a new firm to 
enter the market. This can be explained by an incentive that a market with some number 
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of firms might signal a new firm that there are special characteristics of that market that 
yield positive profit.  
Finally, the results demonstrate that demographic variables representing the 
influence of demand factors help predict both how many firms can operate profitably in a 
market and firms’ product-type decisions. The effects of demand characteristics can be 
large enough in some cases to outweigh the relative difference in the competitive effects. 
As a result, it is indifference for a firm to operate as an independent brewpub or a chain 
brewpub.  
The results might have nontrivial flaws due to several reasons. First, I lump the 
number of firms in a market into three when there are more than three firms in a market. 
Second, I did not include variables that represent the presence of same-type-firm in the 
model. As a result, I cannot observe how the existence of firms in the same type affects 
an entrant of a new firm. 
 Extension of the techniques that this paper employs could also serve to expand 
knowledge about the evolution of industries such as the brewing industry. In particular, 
an explicitly dynamic model along with panel data on the entry and exit decisions of 
firms as well as entry threshold could provide additional insight into this industry.  
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I. Appendix  	  Table	  V	  :	   Ordered	  Probits	  of	  Total	  Firm	  Counts	  	  
 2002 2011 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Constant 0.7337 2.0434 7.5435 1.9491 
Population 2.5315 0.7467 1.4444 0.5017 
PHouseholds -3.8453 0.5599 -2.9802 0.5558 
Area -1.9057 1.1892 0.0116 0.6091 
PHighSchool 0.9241 0.7871 2.1349 0.8145 
Median Household Income 20.712 10.921 16.432 8.8380 
Median Household Income squared -84.3678 75.840 -79.178 53.239 
Median Age 0.1320 0.0600 0.0635 0.0411 
Median Age squared -0.0018 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0005 
PMale -0.7634 1.8487 5.7915 1.6762 
PGerman -0.8914 0.3830 0.0310 0.3773 
PIrish -0.9362 0.9158 -2.2344 0.9566 
Median Wage Food Prep 0.1813 0.7627 2.0999 0.7768 
Number of Observations 947 947 
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Table	  VI	  :	   Heterogeneous	  Products	  Model	  with	  Four	  Opposite-­‐Type	  Firms 
 2002 2005 2008 2011 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Effect on Single Establishment Brewery Restaurants 
Constant 3.0019 2.1008 3.6631 2.0653 8.2581 2.0316 7.5590 1.9794 
Population 1.5285 0.3670 0.9646 0.2923 0.8168 0.2822 0.7347 0.2999 
PHouseholds -3.1108 0.6001 -3.2320 0.5600 -2.8981 0.6108 -2.9875 0.5657 
Area -1.2582 0.9062 -1.4358 1.0128 -1.3163 0.8324 0.0380 0.5359 
Multi Est. Competitor #1 -0.3863 0.1406 -0.6352 0.1301 -0.8994 0.1386 -0.7459 0.1328 
Multi Est.  Competitor #2 -0.0344 0.2578 -0.1034 0.2783 0.0248 0.2912 -0.1137 0.3293 
Multi Est. Competitor #3 -0.2796 0.3947 0.2400 0.8503 0.0895 0.3568 -0.0203 0.4131 
Multi Est. Competitor #4 0.3409 0.6771 0.1326 0.5540 0.7104 0.6006 0.3308 0.6034 
PHighSchool 0.7228 0.7939 0.8416 0.7976 1.7556 0.8521 1.6050 0.8032 
Median Household 
Income 
11.095 11.859 23.349 13.560 9.2149 9.8865 17.713 9.9233 
Median Household 
Income squared 
-67.595 89.060 -169.23 112.73 -55.128 63.506 -122.06 65.638 
Median Age 0.1172 0.0628 0.1485 0.0650 0.1714 0.0437 0.0472 0.0410 
Median Age squared -0.0016 0.0008 -0.0020 0.0009 -0.0022 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0005 
PMale 1.0740 1.8081 0.3773 1.8714 5.3444 1.8832 7.1906 1.6589 
PGerman -0.5085 0.3531 -0.1613 0.3378 -0.6826 0.3525 -0.2228 0.3614 
PIrish -0.4632 0.8803 -2.4689 0.9128 -1.2154 0.9093 -2.2329 0.9167 
Median Wage Food Prep 0.9676 0.7706 1.1566 0.7593 1.6114 0.7911 2.0657 0.7845 
 
Effect on Multiple Establishments Brewery Restaurants 
Constant -0.7756 2.9155 0.7984 2.8307 6.4215 2.9194 8.8170 2.9547 
Population 1.3265 0.3197 1.3318 0.3685 1.5180 0.2905 1.4224 0.3333 
PHouseholds -4.4939 5.2417 -3.4643 0.7103 -3.2896 0.7303 -2.7536 0.7549 
Area -3.1595 0.6287 -3.3033 3.5060 -1.9682 1.8384 -0.6239 0.6920 
Single Est. Competitor #1 -0.5138 0.1105 -0.7812 0.1127 -0.7327 0.1117 -0.7169 0.1099 
Single Est. Competitor #2 -0.1669 0.2033 -0.2382 0.1758 -0.3470 0.2119 -0.4336 0.2094 
Single Est. Competitor #3 0.2286 0.2908 0.0455 0.3975 -0.0991 0.3422 0.3041 0.3788 
Single Est. Competitor #4 0.1960 0.3094 0.1231 0.4458 0.0342 0.5231 -0.4658 0.4071 
PHighSchool 1.4075 1.1227 1.2176 1.1456 0.9091 1.2347 2.2292 1.3245 
Median Household 
Income 
40.622 15.845 40.816 15.252 25.297 12.534 20.444 11.945 
Median Household 
Income squared 
-177.28 122.56 -191.21 116.44 -80.233 79.995 -51.802 72.285 
Median Age 0.2508 0.1004 0.2709 0.0949 0.2948 0.0834 0.3067 0.0805 
Median Age squared -0.0036 0.0014 -0.0037 0.0013 -0.0041 0.0011 -0.0044 0.0011 
PMale -8.0216 2.2045 -7.662 2.2479 -4.0568 2.2400 -3.4955 2.3647 
PGerman -1.6477 0.5476 -3.8118 1.2475 0.9241 0.4459 0.9107 0.4502 
PIrish -3.0727 1.289 -0.4725 0.4682 -0.8358 1.1224 -1.5959 1.1859 
Median Wage Food Prep -0.9668 1.0697 -0.3260 0.9997 1.4856 0.9942 1.9397 1.1163 
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